# the replies

**Replies to the Lucas–Penrose argument**

Benacerraf and Putnam made the point that we only see the sentence is true if we assume the system is consistent, and nobody can certify that about their own mind from inside. So we have the same blind spot as the machine. Chalmers and Feferman wrote detailed critiques of Penrose along the same lines.

Connects to:
- [Lucas, Penrose](https://mapideas.org/i/c_lucas)
- [Gödel’s view](https://mapideas.org/i/c_disj)
- [the replies](https://mapideas.org/i/b_rep)
- [outside is trust](https://mapideas.org/i/tr_trust)

Sources:
- Benacerraf, P. (1967). God, the Devil, and Gödel. The Monist 51(1), 9–32.
- Putnam, H. (1960). Minds and Machines. In S. Hook (ed.), Dimensions of Mind. New York University Press.
- Chalmers, D. (1995). Minds, machines, and mathematics. PSYCHE 2(9).
- Feferman, S. (1995). Penrose’s Gödelian argument. PSYCHE 2(7).

Source: https://mapideas.org/i/c_replies · open on the map: https://mapideas.org/#c_replies